Standard economic theory suggests that agents make a decision based on the outcomes.
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Introduction
One of the key assumptions of standard economic theory is that agents attach value to (economic) outcomes, and not to the process by which the outcomes are generated (Sen, 1995) . If this were the case, people's willingness to financially contribute to the development of a cure for brain damage would be the same independent of whether accidents or excessive drinking are the main cause of the brain damage. Similar considerations would apply to the appreciation and/or provision of public goods as well -whether the demise of a seal population is due to a natural disease or the consequence of fossil fuel extraction at sea, people's willingness to pay for a seal regeneration project should be the same. In fact, this is the question that Bulte, Gerking, List, and de Zeeuw (2005) , posed and they found that people's willingness to pay (WTP) for a seal population recovery program is higher when the demise of the species is due to human activity.
They attributed this difference to a mechanism labeled as "outrage effect" -people are more upset if they think the damage to the environment is caused by certain human activities.
In this paper I extend the work by Bulte et al. (2005) , by addressing the question of whether people's willingness to pay for protecting the environment is also higher if not other humans but they themselves are at least partly responsible for the current (degraded) state of the environment.
More specifically, I analyze whether the propensity to free ride on other people's contributions to an environmental good is reduced -or even eliminated -if respondents are informed that their activities are one of the main causes of local environmental degradation. I do so by eliciting contributions to a reforestation program among farmers in an environmentally valuable area, the Bale Eco-region in Ethiopia, by including or omitting explicit information indication that one of the main forest-related activities the respondents engage in, logging, is among the most important causes of local forest degradation. I find that explicitly stating that logging is one of the main causes of deforestation increases our respondents' willingness to pay. More interestingly, we find that this "responsibility effect" is sufficiently strong to eliminate free rider behavior. When the information about the cause of deforestation is in place, the respondents' willingness to pay for the reforestation project is not significantly different if they are informed of other forest protection projects or not.
Hypothetical bias is one of the most important problems with stated preferences valuation techniques. To mitigate this issue, I decided to financially incentivize farmers' decision by (i) endowing them with a budget that is, in principle, theirs to keep, and (ii) subsequently asking them how much of their budget they are willing to invest in a local reforestation project.
Step (ii) is implemented under three different conditions -providing information on the fact that logging is the main cause of local forest degradation, providing information on the efforts of other countries in the region to protect the forest, and providing information on both. Asking farmers for their financial contribution implies that farmers will think carefully about their decision how much to contribute. This increase in consequentiality makes decision-making more careful, but it does so at the expense of the study underestimating the farmers' true valuation of the forest. However, under the plausible assumption that the extent to which hypothetical versus factual payments affect farmers' WTP levels is the same in all three conditions, my study provides a careful test of the "responsibility effect" on willingness to pay -the fact that I find differences in farmers' contributions between the various treatment arms indicates that also the farmers' true valuation will vary between the three treatment arms.
The setup of my paper is as follows. In section 2, I discuss the issue of hypothetical bias in stated preference valuation technique, and how I dealt with this issue in this study. In section 3, I present the experimental design, randomization issue, and hypotheses of the study. Section 4 includes the results of the experiment and further analysis using different tools. Finally, section 5 presents the conclusion of this study based on the findings.
Valuation of Environmental Goods and Services
Environmental valuation is an important issue as the quantity and quality of the natural resources directly affect the welfare of people depending on them (Dean & Hoeller, 1991) . Nevertheless, environmental valuation is not straightforward owing to the typical nature of the public goods. Pure public goods have two characteristics. First, they are non-excludable -people 3 cannot be excluded from the benefits these goods provide, not even if they failed to contribute to their provision. And second, their consumption is non-rival -one person's consumption of the good does not affect the extent to which others can benefit from their provision. Markets can provide information on people's valuation of private goods, but the characteristics of nonexcludability and non-rivalry in consumption implies that there are no naturally occurring markets for public goods (Carson, Flores, & Meade, 2001) .
2 Artificial markets for public goods, however, can be developed by designing different valuation methods.
One such valuation method is contingent valuation (CVM), which was developed by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947) . CVM is in essence a survey method in which the respondent is provided with a description of a hypothetical (government) public goods provision program, like a bird protection project or an oil spill prevention program. The respondents are given detailed information on the benefits that the program will provide -type of birds targeted, what they look like, their importance for maintaining the integrity of the ecosystem, and the estimate increase in population (or prevention of their decline) the program is expected to realize. After having provided this information, the respondent's valuation of the project is elicited -either by simply asking him/her what the maximum amount of money is that she is willing to pay for the project to be implemented (so-called "open-ended bid elicitation") , or by asking the respondent whether she would be willing to pay a specific amount of money for the project's implementation (yes or no)
-where the amount to be paid is varied between respondents in order to be able to elicit the public good's demand function. The second type of question is often framed as a referendum ("if the project would require the imposition of a tax of $x, would you vote in favor of the project, yes or no?") and is typically referred to as the dichotomous choice valuation approach (Adamowicz, Boxall, Williams, & Louviere, 1998; Mitchell & Carson, 1989) .
Since its first application (Robert, 1963) , the use of the dichotomous choice valuation technique has increased at the expense of the open-ended valuation approach (Freeman III, Herriges, & Kling, 2014; Haab, Interis, Petrolia, & Whitehead, 2013; Oerlemans, Chan, & Volschenk, 2016) . The reason is that theoretically the dichotomous choice approach is incentive compatible, in the sense that there is little reason to strategically misrepresent one's preferences 2 The same applies to public good provision: The classic explanation for positive contribution is either pure altruism (Carson et al., 2001) or impure altruism (Andreoni, 1988 (Andreoni, , 1989 .
(by saying "yes" to a price offer that is above one's true value or "no" to an offer that is below one's true value), whereas respondents may strategically (grossly) over-or understate their willingness to pay if they think that doing so affects the probability of the project being implemented. (Cummings, Elliott, Harrison, & Murphy, 1997; Taylor, 1998) .
However, experimental studies have found some unresolved limitations with the referendum mechanism. They typically find a disparity in valuation results between the hypothetical referendum and the real referendum (Cummings & Taylor, 1999; Hausman, 2012) . It is often the case that in CV, the WTPs elicited tend to be higher than in situations where the yes/no question has real consequences (with all respondents being forced to pay and the project being implemented if the majority votes in favor). Two of the main causes for this upward bias is that the hypothetical nature of the method invites socially desirable answers while the respondent also fails to pay enough attention to the budget consequences of their answer (if the project had not been hypothetical).
To address this issue, I decided to financially incentivize farmers' decision to contribute to the public good -a reforestation project in their local forest. Whereas this decreases the farmers'
propensity to provide socially desirable answers, it does so at the cost of underestimating their true willingness to pay. This can be seen as follows.
Let us denote the number of trees planted by community member i with . If there are n community members, the number of trees planted is = ∑ =1 . From the community's perspective there are local benefits to having more trees. Let us denote the local benefits accruing to community member i (improved soil protection, improved retaining of groundwater, etc.) with ( ). Denoting community member i's budget for tree planting with and his/her costs of planting trees with , the improvement in community member i's welfare associated with planting Q trees is then equal to
and the social welfare consequence of the community planting (= ∑ =1 ) trees is
Maximizing (2), the socially optimal number of trees planted by each community member is implicitly defined by
But if a community member does not attach any value to the benefits of planting trees accruing to his/her fellow community members, he/she maximizes (1), and hence his/her privately optimal number of trees planted is
Comparing (3) and (4) , it is clear that the privately optimal number of trees planted is smaller than the socially optimal number, while the true social (marginal) value of a tree, ∑ ′ =1
, which was already revealed, only gives inference about ′ .
For this study, we financially incentivize community members to choose how many trees should be planted on their behalf. Unless all community members are pure altruists, our estimates of the marginal social value of trees are anywhere between ′ and ∑ ′ =1
, and hence may be a gross underestimate of the true social value. With this approach, we trade off the benefits of a financially incentivized decision at the cost of underestimating the true value. However, as we are interested in the treatment differences rather than in the levels, we choose to financially incentivize private decision-making.
Therefore, we do not estimate the true social value of trees. But we argue that if the framing affects the private decisions in a specific way, the social values are likely to vary similarly.
Hypotheses, Context, and Experimental Design
In this study, I hypothesize that the scenario that includes the information about humancaused environmental damages will attenuate free riding. The intuition is that such information has the "responsibility effect" on the respondents and hence reinforces the subsequent decisionmaking. Haab et al. (2013) argue that to the extent the CVM reinforces the subsequent decisionmaking, it measures true preferences for public goods.
Previous studies have found that including the human-caused environmental damage information will increase the WTP estimates (Bulte et al., 2005; Carson et al., 2003) . Efforts have also been made to explain this result. For instance, Bulte et al. (2005) studied how different causes (human vs. natural) affect WTP values. They found that people state a higher WTP when the cause of environmental damage is human activity. They attributed this difference to a mechanism that has been labeled as "outrage effect" -where people contribute more if they think the damage to the environment is caused by certain human activities, because this makes them feel upset.
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The alternative explanation was the "responsibility effect." This hypothesis predicts that higher WTP values when the causes of environmental degradation are human activities correlate with how seriously people think they are responsible for these causes (Brown, Peterson, Marc Brodersen, Ford, & Bell, 2005; Walker, Morera, Vining, & Orland, 1999) . In this study, I attempt to explain why the WTP varies under the human cause and natural cause scenarios but argue that higher WTP values are reported in the human cause scenario since it attaches a responsibility effect to decision-makers. The responsibility effect thus implies that through reinforcement of subsequent decision-making, the attenuation of free ridership can be achieved.
As noted above, this study is an incentivized experiment that elicited WTP for a public good, afforestation, with real financial contributions. The experiment was conducted in Ethiopia (see below for details). The experimental design enabled real money contributions by allowing for an initial endowment.
WTP takes six discrete values (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50) , and contribution is conditional on the endowment amount (50ETB). Participants make a decision of how much to contribute in one of the three scenarios. In all scenarios (treatments), as in the standard CV surveys, the basic information of the public good, the payment mechanism, and the rule for the good provision are included. Specifically, all the CV surveys contain background about the importance of environmental good provision (deforestation and desertification), the good provided (afforestation), the mode of payment and budget constraint, and finally, the question of WTP elicitation (with only six options of how much they can contribute, as explained below). Hence, all the surveys have the same background, good, and payment mechanism but differ in the information used as treatments in the experiment.
The treatments differ in the following regards: i) One survey includes the information on human-caused deforestation (illegal logging), and I call this treatment human-caused; ii) One survey has the information on efforts that are being done elsewhere (neighboring countries and the rest of the world), and I call this treatment effort-elsewhere; and iii) One survey combines the above two pieces of information, and I call this treatment combination.
Subjects in the human-caused treatment were provided only with information on the cause of deforestation (illegal logging), in addition to the standard introduction in the survey. In the same way, the combination treatment group received information both on the human cause of deforestation and on the effort that has been undertaken by the neighboring and international community to reduce deforestation. The script of the combination treatment reads as follows: 
Randomization, Recruitment, and Experimental Procedure
In this study, a between-subjects experimental design was employed. Participants were randomly assigned to only one of the three treatments. The design also followed within village randomization such that in each village subjects were randomly assigned to the treatments. Based on the random assignment to one of the treatment groups, subjects made their decisions (how much to contribute to the afforestation project in their villages).
We recruited subjects in three villages near the Bale Eco-region in Ethiopia. There were 96 subjects in total in this field experiment. The subjects were called through the village-level administration agents to come to the meeting places. Inviting subjects to the meeting via village administration agents is not unusual in the study area. Village-level meetings are a common occurrence in which various issues are discussed on a regular basis. Hence, it is highly unlikely that the village administration's assigned person would disseminate systematically biased information to recruit certain types of individuals only 3 . For this reason, we assume that local administrators' invitation of participants to the experiment is a random phenomenon and thus expect reliable treatment effects.
Upon the arrival of the subjects to the meeting place, the experimenter gave a brief explanation of the research project and the researcher's background. Next, subjects underwent two tasks in the field. The first task was general survey administration to collect the background information on the subjects. Experimenters collected this information individually from the subjects in the form of an interview.
The second task was the implementation of the WTP elicitation experiment. After randomly assigning subjects to their respective groups, the experimenters loudly read the script to each treatment group. The reading of scripts to each treatment group was done in a way that one group had no chance of listening to others' script. Furthermore, the subjects made the decision individually after being approached by the experimenters in the form of an interview. Finally, based on their decision the money was immediately collected.
Sub-hypotheses
This study, as argued above, examines if the information on human-caused damage reinforces responsibility and attenuates free riding. Specifically, the following hypothesis is tested.
H1: Willingness to pay values when human-caused damage information is included are higher than
when the information is omitted.
H2: Willingness to pay values where effort-elsewhere information is included are lower if
information of human-caused damage is omitted.
Thus, the study posits that including information on the human-caused damage yields higher willingness to pay. Table 1 shows a test of covariate balance across the treatments. The balance test of participants' characteristics is made using joint orthogonality tests across the treatments. From Table 1 , it can be seen that gender participation statistically differs across the treatments. However, it should be noted that differences in female participants across treatments are small in magnitude. For example, the third treatment group contains only 3 women more compared to the other two treatments. Similarly, the membership in local collaborative forest management differs across the treatments. The subjects of this experiment are also people who care about the environment and take the seriousness of environmental degradation into consideration. This opinion does not differ across treatments. 
Results
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Experimental Results
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
The Kruskal-Wallis overall difference test indicates a statistically significant difference between the three treatment groups. Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that states no difference between the three treatment groups at p = 0.0097.
The difference in means across treatments is tested using a pairwise Mann-Whitney U test. Accordingly, the difference in mean WTP of subjects in the human-caused treatment group is statistically different from the mean WTP under the effort-elsewhere treatment. Thus, we can reject the hypothesis of no difference in means of WTP between the human-caused treatment and effortelsewhere treatment at p < 0.01. Similarly, the difference in mean WTP of subjects in the combination and effort-elsewhere treatments is also statistically significant. Thus, we can reject the hypothesis of no difference in means of WTP between the combination treatment and the effortelsewhere treatment at p = 0.0041. Finally, the mean WTP difference between the human-caused treatment and combination treatment is not significant.
Hence, subjects' WTP is significantly higher when human-caused deforestation information is included. The lower value of WTP in the effort-elsewhere treatment suggests the free riding behavior of participants on others' contributions. This also suggests the inability of the decisionmaking process (in the effort-elsewhere treatment) to reinforce the sense of responsibility, thus being less binding for decision-makers. This can be inferred because the sample pool of this study is made up of direct potential contributors to the environmental damage (deforestation). Hence, it is straightforward to see that responsibility effect, that people feel responsible for reverting the damage, as the mechanism that increases WTP values in the human-caused treatment group.
Therefore, the decision-making process that holds decision makers responsible seems to increase WTP. This, in turn, attenuates the free riding problem in the CVM. The results of our experiment suggest that market-like decision-making in the CV experiment can be implemented by reinforcing the responsibility effect on the subjects.
The distribution of WTP across the treatment groups can be seen from Figure 1 , which presents the histograms of WTP by treatment. As noted before, the WTP is a discrete variable taking values within the range of [0 to 50] with 10 ETB step size increases. The overall distribution of subjects'
WTP shows a right-skewed distribution (Figure 1d ) similar to other WTP studies (Green, Jacowitz, Kahneman, & McFadden, 1998; Gunatilake & Tachiri, 2014; Kanninen, 2007; Martín-Fernández et al., 2014) . Some participants have zero WTP, which also translates to having preference of less than 10ETB including none. The majority of subjects' WTP values lie within the interval between 10ETB and 20 ETB. The distribution of WTP values, however, differs across the treatment groups. In general, the histograms suggest that the WTP values vary more in the human-caused treatment and the combination treatment compared to the treatment of effort-elsewhere.
Econometric Analysis
Further analysis of the above results controlling for different covariates is presented using regressions. Utilizing regression will furthermore help us test the construct validity of our CV (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50) . To take into consideration the discrete nature of the dependent variable, the model is estimated using interval as well as ordered probit regression. The ordered probit regression in this study serves as a robustness check given the weak normality of the dependent variable (revealed by the Shapiro-Wilk test), which is assumed by interval regression. WTPij = β0 + β1 TrLoggingij+ β2TrInfoAloneij + β3 Xij + εij……………… (5).
WTP values are regressed on treatment variables to extract treatment effects, which are (β1, β2). β0
represents a constant variable that is also a baseline treatment. The baseline treatment in our case is the combination treatment. Finally, β3 captures the subject-specific characteristics, such as the subjects' age, educational status, gender, income, land size, family size, and membership in environmental conservation group. Table 2 ).
Controlling for participants' characteristics (columns 3 and 4), under both interval and ordered probit regressions, does not really affect the above estimated coefficients. However, the explanatory variables can be utilized as a test of construct validity. Specifically, the economic variable, income of participants, seems to predict WTP values consistent with the standard expectation -that is, the higher the income, the higher the WTP values, which is statistically significant. Another interesting point is that being a member of the local collaborative forest conservation has a positive effect on WTP. In the study area, it is possible to engage in forest conservation with a group called a collaborative forest management group. This is a local conservation group that looks after the surrounding forest to prevent illegal logging, and in return it shares the benefit that might be found from the forest. The benefits are not always substantially significant in a sense that it doesn't allow for a regular derivation of money from the forest products. Nonetheless, the benefits include sharing profits from the sale of trees that are no longer standing and needed to be taken from the forest, as well as the profits derived from legally permitted hunting. In this case, the hunter must pay a fee for any animal he kills. Hence, the positive correlation sign of CFM membership and WTP in the regression is expected since the members anticipate being the immediate beneficiaries of the afforestation project in their respective villages. However, the interactions of CFM membership with the treatments do not significantly affect the WTP values (results not included here). This implies that the difference is the same across the treatments.
Welfare Analysis and Robustness Check
We analyzed the welfare implications of the treatments using the survival function. Traditionally CV surveys were examined by setting the response probability in a survival function format.
Setting WTP responses as a survival function means that, instead of the original notion of "time,"
survival is defined by all the possible amounts (payments) that the respondents can contribute to the project. A respondent with positive willingness to pay "survives" that amount and a respondent with negative willingness to pay "fails" that amount.
Hence, in the CVM, which uses a payment card as a type of discrete choice mechanism, the log likelihood function is calculated by the difference in WTP densities evaluated at the discrete points.
Likelihood function can then be maximized based on the selected parametric distribution (shape) such as in a standard Kaplan-Meier and Weibull estimator. Setting data into a survival function format enables censoring of the discrete WTP values. A further advantage of utilizing this function is that the survival analysis is in line with the assumption of the key economic theory that the cost of the fraction of participants with positive WTP decreases monotonically (Carson et al., 2003) .
Hence, in this study, the Kaplan-Meier survival curve is used to present the summary measure of people's WTP under the three treatments (Figure 2) . Given the right skewed nature of WTP -that is, there seem to be individuals who are not willing to contribute -mean summary for welfare analysis might not be the correct representation. Hence, the demand for the environmental good under the three treatments is compared with the 50 th quintile of the graph. As can be seen from Figure 2 , the human-caused treatment appears to have a higher survival rate than the other two treatments. Looking at the median survival time, which is the probability of survival at 0.5, the effort elsewhere treatment appears to give 10 ETB versus about 20 ETB in the other two treatments. 
Robustness Check: Estimators of WTP
We assessed the role of covariates in the survival analysis using Weibull regression. In Weibull regression, as in other survival models, hazard function is an important concept. In this regression, in a zero hazard rate (1-1). This is to say, for one ETB increase, the hazard rate will stay constant.
Hence, the economic variable seems to predict the WTP decision.
Furthermore, the role of treatments as shown by the Weibull regression is not really different from the results in the main finding. In Table 4 , the treatment coefficients show that being in the treatment group of effort-elsewhere increases the hazard rate by more than 3 times compared to the baseline treatment (i.e., combination). That is, being offered the effort-elsewhere scenario decreases WTP. In general, despite the assumption of a specific shape parameter in the Weibull regression, the results in this regression are consistent with the main findings (Table 3) .
Conclusion
The contingent valuation method was designed to elicit preferences for environmental goods for which conventional markets are unavailable (Carson et al., 2003; Hanemann, 1994) . By allowing the attachment of monetary values to environmental goods, CV creates conventional market-like decision-making. In this study we see evidence for this claim -that is, the creation of market-like behavior by CV -from the preferences of the subjects. Specifically, the relationship between the predictors and WTP values shows evidence of the subjects' preference for environmental goods.
First, the economic variables seem to be in line with the standard economic theory that the higher the income the higher the WTP of participants. Second, other predictors such as the members of local collaborative forest management seem to have higher WTP.
Nonetheless, the participants' preferences are not free from the temptation of free riding in the CVM. Free riding, however, can be reduced by the method that reinforces conventional marketlike behavior. This study tests the hypothesis of whether human-caused environmental damages increase the WTP estimates by including the information in the CVM. Extant literature notes that including information on human-caused environmental damage in contingent valuation surveys increases the WTP values. This was, however, attributed to outrage effect -that is, because respondents are upset, they contribute more to environmental goods. This study finds evidence that such an increase in WTP estimates is caused by attenuation of the free riding problem in CVM.
The mechanism for free riding attenuation is illustrated in this study as a reinforcement of marketlike behavior via inducing a sense of responsibility in respondents.
In line with this argument, the experimental examination of WTP estimates under the humancaused damage treatment shows higher values, whereas the effort-elsewhere treatment, as an
indicator to free riding, shows significantly lower WTP. The correlations of the two treatments with WTP show opposite associations. Hence, with the information of human-caused damage, we see less downward bias, which is assumed to affect the CVM.
Hence, the findings of this study indicate that the mechanism of downward bias attenuation has to do with the responsibility effect. The responsibility effect induces market-like decisions in this study for two reasons. First, the sample pool of this study consists of participants who potentially engage in human-caused damage. In this case, the responsibility effect can easily be reinforced by including information on human-caused damage. Second, the majority of participants have a strong belief that the current environmental damage is a serious problem in terms of the near future consequence (as measured in the survey question). This suggests that the above belief can be translated to market-like preference behavior with the appropriate valuation mechanism.
In a nutshell, the downward bias in CVM can be reduced by allowing information that induces the responsibility effect to make the decisions consequential. By creating such a decision process, market-like behavior can be generated. In the same way, an environmental valuation process should take into account two conditions: the subject pool and their attitude towards environmental conservation. Finally, policies that induce responsibility can be efficient in engaging participants in the face of a free riding temptation.
